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A MICROANALYTIC APPROACH TO ADMINISTRA­
TION OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE WITH PARTICULAR 
REFERENCE TO UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMMES
If we are to keep pace with scientific and technological 
as well as with institutional and social advancements, 
technical assistance is essential. In this article our fo­
cus of interest is on technical assistance rendered by 
the United Nations system of international organiza­
tions. How much has been achieved, and how well, 
may be glimpsed through such official records as the 
1965 Anniversary Review of the United Nations Ex­
panded Programme of Technical Assistance1 or 
through such research as that of the United Nations 
Research Institute for Social Development2 which 
represent a growing universality in technical assis­
tance, in terms of contributors and recipients, as 
well as painfully accumulated experience of learning 
by trial and error.
The underlying reasons for the existence of the 
United Nations Development Programme were clear­
ly stated by the Economic and Social Council in estab­
lishing the Expanded Programme of Technical As­
sistance in 19493 when it recognized «the significant 
contribution to economic development that can be 
made by an expansion of the international exchange 
of technical knowledge through international coop­
eration among countries», and expressed the belief 
that «Α sound international programme of this char­
acter must combine and make use of the experience 
of many nations, with differing social patterns and 
cultural traditions and at different stages of develop­
ment». This approach has remained. In 1965 the UN 
Secretary-General reaffirmed that the purpose of mul­
tilateral technical assistance is «to organize ourselves 
with enough courage, purpose and coherence to wipe 
out the most glaring disparities and create a world so­
ciety in which both the fruits of progress and the bur­
dens of responsibility will be more equally shared». 
In the words of the 1965 report of the Technical As­
sistance Board, the «Essential function of the Ex­
panded Programme is to provide the means of giving 
technical assistance to countries which need it, accord­
ing to priorities determined by themselves, to over­
come specific problems standing in the way of their 
further economic and social development».4
1. Technical Assistance Board, 15 Years and 150.000 Skills: 
An Anniversary Review of the United Nations Expanded Pro­
gramme of Technical Assistance (New York: United Nations 
1965), 139 pp.
2. Herbert H. Hyman, Gen. N. Levine and Charles R. Wright, 
Inducing Social Change in Developing Countries: An In­
ternational Survey of Expert Advice (Geneva: United Na­
tions Research Institute for Social Development, 1967), 224 pp. 
For a summary of important findings see Annex I.
3. In the «founding» resolution 222A(ix) of 15 August 1949.
4. Technical Assistance Board, op. cit., p. 31.
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During its fifteen years of existence, the Expanded 
Programme of Technical Assistance spent the equiv­
alent of $ 500 million. During the same period, United 
Nations specialized agencies dispursed $ 200 mil­
lion. In addition, the Special Fund, since its inception 
in 1958, has committed nearly half a billion dollars 
for technical assistance projects, to which recipient 
governments have probably contributed at least as 
much. Furthermore, Special Fund surveys and feasi­
bility studies alone have generated, directly or indi­
rectly, investments totaling over a billion dollars.
In the course of time, however, a contradiction be­
came apparent. Although the processes of technical 
assistance have been set in motion, it has been felt that 
it has not fulfilled many of its sanguine expectations. 
One cannot help being aware of a certain feeling of 
discontent regarding the discrepancy between aspira­
tions and realities, and of disheartening undertones 
about its efficacy. Popular assertions that technical 
assistance shows only sporadic signs of fulfillment 
are often persuasively expressed. And there are many 
examples, sometimes inelegantly referred to, reflec­
ting uneasiness at the interminably slow pace of 
change.
But understanding is not advanced by concentra­
ting on such matters. Though some of the criticism has 
merit, it should not obscure the implications of tech­
nical assistance for the future and the quality of digni­
ty which should characterize it. The common weak­
ness of such criticism contains a very simple but funda­
mental flaw. It reflects a concern not with how devel­
opment problems are to be solved but only whether 
they are solved or not. In other words, it ignores not 
only the social and psychological factors that techni­
cal assistance is influenced by, but also many of the 
seriously sensitive variables which it brings into the 
picture. It overlooks the effects of the values built in­
to the culture of the developing country that may fos­
ter or hinder change. More specifically, it ignores the 
capacity of individuals to absorb the change that tech­
nical assistance brings and to make such change a be­
havior of daily life, a matter of household concept 
and practice, so to speak.1
The issue is further complicated partly by anxiety 
to over-emphasize the virtues of change and partly
1 .As Professor Kavadias of UNESCO has remarked,«It is not 
because they are intellectually deficient or different, but because 
the intellectual processes which then take place in their minds, 
and which should enable them to assimilate the innovation, prove 
to be ineffective». And he continues, «Indeed, if a message is 
to be understood and assimilated, it must find a place among the 
assembly of ideas which the person already has-and which, as 
far as the message is concerned, for, the logical frame of refer­
ence and, at the same time,«the psychological assimilator frame», 
according to J. Piaget’s formula». George Kavadias, «The 
Assimilation of the Scientific and Technological «Message», 
XVIII International Social Science Journal, 1966, p. 363.
38
by a desire to produce visible results which might 
manifest marginal rather than central phenomena of 
change. Much is to be said on the notion of rising ex­
pectations which holds that many of the economic, 
social and political problems of development arise 
from a faster expansion of expectations than of a- 
chievements. But we must be careful. Our argument 
does not infer that people in developing countries are 
ineffective in facing the problems and tasks of every 
day life. To employ a metaphor, were our Paleolithic 
ancestors less efficient in their environment than mod­
ern man? Is it not possible that if we were to live 
their lives, we would be less efficient than they were?
Without gaining much knowledge about the actual 
mechanism by which technical assistance leads to 
change, it may not be surprising if, for a variety of 
reasons, its tasks become seriously sensitive and, in a 
way, seemingly impossible. To understand the role of 
technical assistance, the relevant changes which it 
causes, and mode of its administration, there is a need 
to draw upon many fields which will help us understand 
the multiple forces at work. What follows is only sug­
gestive: a set of reflections based on personal im­
pressions deduced from many years experience in 
technical assistance.
a point of view
In the past, men associated the sources of change 
with the sources of power—a visible set of acts by a 
king or a lawmaker or a prophet. Gradually it came 
to be realized that behind their acts there is an intan­
gible net of customs, institutions, and cultures, which 
subtly constrains and sets the boundaries of social 
action. At the same time it was recognized that there 
are social forces (whether impersonal processes such 
as demographic pressures, science and technology, 
or conscious efforts such as demands of depressed 
groups for social mobility and equality) which gener­
ate change. But change, particularly when there is not 
enough time to adjust to it is never an easy process. 
What we are concerned with here is that the absorp­
tion of technical assistance is accompanied by quali­
tative changes that tend to upset established ways. 
They may cause apprehension and disequilibrium, 
and thus generate complex tensions and conflicts.
In reviewing the changes which technical assistance 
brings, there can be no black-and-white judgements. 
It is not possible to predict specific outcomes or pro­
vide straightforward answers. Technical assistance 
is not carried out on an experimental basis but in a 
context which makes it difficult to establish external 
indices and to follow up and quantify its results. Ex­
pectations regarding the behavior of homo economi- 
cus in absorbing technical assistance are a myth. Pat­
terns of values, preferences that affect choices, and
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attitudes to life, with which a given country sets out 
on the path to development may hot be suited to the 
immediate successful accomplishment of the tasks of 
technical assistance. Certain values and institutional 
behavior patterns, considered conducive to success­
ful development, may have first to be induced by the 
process of development itself.1 Considerations such 
as these lead one to pay attention to the effects which 
technical assistance has on values, motives and at­
titudes presumably because in the long run it is these 
factors that determine the extend to which technical 
assistance will be assimilated within the processes of 
country development.
This line of argument suggests that country devel­
opment may draw new strength and new emphasis out 
of the tensions which technical assistance creates. And 
since it might not be feasible and, indeed, even doubt­
ful whether it is desirable to suppress tensions and 
conflicts (change in any human society is a result of 
some sort of pressure), it seems necessary to place in 
a new context the difficulties besetting technical as­
sistance. We must distinguish between expectations 
and reality, between intriguing ideas for old hands and 
the learnings from a situation as it actually exists, be­
tween what is said and what is done, between what one 
might like to do and what one is able to do, between a 
constraint and a removable stumbling block. How 
these are balanced in a given country will help deter­
mine the effectiveness of technical assistance.2 Such 
an awareness reinforces a growing conviction that the 
first task in the administration of technical assistance 
is to derive a synthesis of operationally mesningful 
and manageable concepts. And this cannot be a- 
chieved without taking an anterior view of the combi­
nation of factors that make-up the technical assist­
ance project.
the technical assistance project
On a microscale the project manifests a special qual­
ity. It is future oriented and as such it has come to oc­
cupy a central position in country development. At 
the centre of creativity, it has become the kev unit in 
the organization of technical assistance, deriving its 
support largely from its commitment to development. 
Though not a «crash program», it represents a well 
defined and systematic attempt at communicadon in
1. As McClelland points out, «If the people want the benefits of 
the advanced material culture of modern civilization...then they 
must accept many of the values and other culture patterns which 
support such a civilization». David C. McClelland, The Achiev­
ing Society (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1961), pp. 395- 
396.
2. For a very interesting article on the way in which people 
perceive themselves as competent or otherwise, see Elisabeth 
Colson, «Competence and Incompetence in the Context of Inde­
pendence», 8 Current Anthropology, 1967, pp. 92-111.
a particular subject. It provides the general perspec­
tive for understanding the issues that affect the admi­
nistration of technical assistance, sensitive as they are 
to the attitudes, emotions, presuppositions and goals 
of the host country. Such an emphasis provides not 
only a convenient point of departure for analysis of 
the administration of technical assistance itself but 
also, by narrowing our attention, gives us a specific 
starting point for understanding development proces­
ses and the purposes of these processes.
At the project level, it is probably easier to find 
operational measures of change, even though here as 
elsewhere, it is not possible to generalize from a par­
ticular context and it is not feasible to arrive at a uni­
versally applicable diagnosis or a body of universal 
rules. As developing countries are at different stages 
of technico-scientific and socio-economic develop­
ment, each with its own unique socio-cultural environ­
ment, it is not possible to anticipate and make accurate 
predictions for the administration of technical as­
sistance in general. The matter is that technical assis­
tance projects, each with a different frame of reference 
and with varying degrees of intensity, cannot be rep­
licated; each project is different from all others in 
certain respects and the unique aspects of each must 
be adequately taken into account. In short, many of 
the key problems concerning the administration of 
technical assistance are related to the political, social 
and cultural matrix of the particular country at that 
time. Our viewpoint must be wider than the purely 
technical aspects of the project. The kind of questions 
we are concerned with here include: Given the impor­
tance of technical assistance in the processes of devel­
opment, how is the technical assistance project ab­
sorbed within these processes? How does the process 
of penetration of technical assistance begin? More 
specifically, given the need to reach its full potential, 
what is happening in the microcosmic realm of the 
technical assistance project as it is assimilated in the 
processes of country development?
To illuminate the factors involved and understand 
the basis for the differential response to technical as­
sistance, it is worth while to explore briefly five views 
which underlie all judgements in this paper. They con­
cern questions of impetus, rationale, internalization, 
functionality, and evaluation regarding the technical 
assistance project. These views are not equal to each 
other in their level of generality or scope of compre­
hension, as they overlap and one view often subsumes 
some aspects of the others. Their function is not to 
predict, but to explain.
Regarding impetus. This refers to the central notion 
that a technical assistance project has an impetus which 
originates from the outreaching of socio-economic 
needs and technico-scientific problems of a developing
39
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country. We are concerned here with social factors 
that tend to shape the flow of technical assistance 
prior to the operation of the selective processes that 
are examined later.
In the daily pattern of life, each major scientific or 
technological advance has, in its own period, created 
revolutionary changes. We can point to the electric 
light, introduced only in 1884, or to the telegraph as 
compared to other means of dispatch, to telephone 
over telegraph, to radio over telephone, to television 
over radio. Change of all kinds can be recognized and 
accepted as inherent in the historical process through 
which men and their societies have become what they 
are today.
This view holds that a country which is develop­
ment-motivated will be more effective in coping with 
desired change and future attainments than one which 
is overwhelmingly oriented toward tradition and domi­
nated by a role system structured on past experience. 
Furthermore, a country which places great emphasis 
upon human and cultural goals, will pay close atten­
tion to the impact of technical assistance from the view 
ofits technico-scientific influence on man himself—his 
personality and his value systems. How then can mo­
tivation and commitment to development be obtained 
if basic values and attitudes preclude such behavior?
This raises the problem of social and cultural rela­
tivism. Many countries encounter great difficulties 
when their traditional ways of life arc in conflict with 
modern aspirations. The value system of a peasant so­
ciety can be deeply hostile to technical change. Tradi­
tional attitudes are often self-validating and respond 
to every question with conviction, and traditional 
techniques may be revered as ritual behavior; they 
may fit into a rhythm of life and ceremony and enjoy 
the support of all communal institutions. The phenom­
enon of «defensive ignorance» or «rejection pat­
tern» is often practiced by communities warding off 
external influences.
In the administration of technical assistance, it is 
important to know not only the social structures and 
social institutions of the country, but also the assump­
tions behind the request for technical assistance. The 
influence of a technical assistance project is bound to 
be greater if men have been reinforced to endure the 
hardship and pain associated with change. It is not the 
flash of enthousiasm that we are concerned with here 
but the persistently sustained effort. Any move to 
change by individuals or groups will be helped or 
hindered by the approval or disapproval of the 
society concerned. The ingrained, partly unconscious 
and usually unchallenged ideas and values that make 
up a person’s «reality world» are built into him from 
early childhood largely by the group of which he hap­
pens to be a part. The group not only creates a 
particular web of interaction but also influences the
40
basic premises of his thinking even when he makes 
a conscious effort to free himself of its control and 
to look at the world with fresh eyes.
One should not be surprised if the attitudes and 
practices that the project is designed to modify and 
which may appear negative and obscured at first 
glance, proved to be perfectly rational in a given sit­
uation. However, a developing country need not, and 
actually should not be considered either as static or 
progressive; both elements coexist. Rapid population 
growth and redistribution, inabitity of traditional ways 
to support the growing population, rapid spread of 
newly felt needs, including multiplication of demands 
for new consumer goods, mass communications, and 
so on, all make the problem one of influencing direc­
tions of change rather than of overcoming traditional­
ist obstacles.
Regarding rationale. An alternative way of looking 
at technical assistance is that each project has a ratio­
nale traceable to the government’s policies which tend 
to shape the country’s development: its articulate­
ness, priorities and sense of direction. But as the pro­
ject comes to grips with reality, its rationale becomes 
elusive. Conditions are rarely optimal. The view of the 
technical assistance project as a series of orderly steps 
intelligently directed toward an objective specified in 
advance seems to be both oversimplified and false.
At this point one runs the risk of the rationalistic 
fallacy of believing that there is an optimal path for 
any action. Rationality depends not only on the objec­
tive features, but also on the inherent abilities, emo­
tions and previous experiences of those involved. The 
world is not made up of inert structures which may be 
pushed and pulled in a multitude of ways. We cannot 
assume that the decision-maker in the project is a ra­
tional man who knows all possible alternatives, under­
stands the possible consequences of each alternative, 
and arrives at a clear understanding of preferences 
among them. For a variety of reasons he may not be 
content with the intrinsic attractiveness of the proj­
ect.
This second view holds that if project goals are not 
comprehensible or if they are misunderstood (or 
poorly understood) the project is less likely to con­
tribute to the country’s planned development. Misun­
derstood goals can lead to a fanatic attachment to tra­
dition which may practically nullify the chances of 
seeing the project absorbed into the processes of 
country development. Furthermore, project objec­
tives rarely specify the required preconditions; the 
necessary institutions, attitudes, motivations and re­
sources necessary to bring about change in the subject 
of the project are never all present. Fundamental in­
consistencies often occur between project assumptions 
and project objectives which may be deci ded on the ha-
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sis of chance or on transient political preferences.
In spite of the above reservations, it is useful to act 
as if the rationality of the project were correct. It al­
lows for stretching beyond the narrow limits of the 
goals of the project. It helps us to understand that if 
any shift of attitudes and practices is to result from 
the new information that the project brings, the direc­
tion of the project would have to consider the views of 
the reference group affected by the project. If a partic­
ular project is supported over a long period, the nor­
mal social mechanisms in the country’s development 
effort may suffice to correct the situation. Some ad­
justments will be easier if, instead of concentrating on 
project objectives, a broader and deeper time perspec­
tive is invoked. It will then be possible to develop an 
in-built capacity to adjust the subject of the project, 
on a continuing basis, to constant change.
Technical assistance calls for intelligence and logic, 
redefinition of the image of self, redirection of the cog­
nitive categories, reformulation of questions and crea­
tion of new capacities in relation to task and time. But 
this is not enough. Something more is needed; a 
guiding purpose, a vital principle. Narrow project ob­
jectives can never replicate the phenomena of growth 
and reproduction, including reasoning, feeling, choos­
ing. Such an admission reflects that the rationale of 
the project would have to be considered within the 
broad social goals of a country just as the impetus of 
the project is related to its social context. It sees the 
project in intimate contact with the shifting structure 
of events, not in isolation from them.
Regarding internalization. A technical assistance 
project has often been observed to begin in doubt and 
skepticism. This third view holds that a project cannot 
create and maintain self-sustained changewithout par­
ticipation and responsiveness from within. Persist­
ently sustained exertion is a function of attachment to 
a task, to the norms which govern its performance, 
and to the role in which those norms are embodied. 
This is what we mean by the ability of the project to be 
internalized.
Whether a technical assistance project will be inter­
nalized and induce sustained change cannot be fore­
seen. Though every country w; 11 respond in some way 
to outside stimuli, the precise nature of this response 
cannot be known with precision. The process of inter­
nalization often gives rise to tensions in many areas 
of human activity but, perhaps, they may be more ob­
vious in rural communities where ways of doing things 
have been unfolded continuously from the experiences 
of the past. Land reform, for example, may be consid­
ered to be a necessary prerequisite to a project con­
cerned with the introduction of new farming techni­
ques. But the adoption of such techniques depends 
primarily on the willing cooperation (without external
enforcement) of the individual farmer.1
The linkage of technical assistance with action gives 
the training aspects of a project high priority. The 
strengthening of a task-oriented, responsible stratum 
of a segment of the population may be the most im­
portant precondition for internalization of technical 
assistance. The question now arises: does one (and 
the above example—the individual farmer) wish to 
learn in order to decide between alternative courses 
of action, an achievement value, or in order to feel se­
cure in the acts which tradition in any case has dic­
tated? Changes in the ways of knowing can give rise 
to great uneasiness. The possibility is that traditional 
institutions may have validated explanations as they 
may have practices.
Another matter on which our understanding has 
improved is that a technical assistance project cannot 
take the form of indiscriminate replication of institu­
tions and practices in developed countries, for imita­
tion is not a matter of mechanical or passive repro­
duction. Imitation means mentally reliving the proc­
ess which led to the creation of what is imitated. Many 
experiences have indicated that imitation, no mat­
ter how advantageous it may seem to be, is not ac­
cepted uncritically. Furthermore, a demonstration ef­
fect—a deliberate effort to show that change or improve­
ment is both possible and desirable-cannot be taken 
for granted. Any reference group acting as the car­
rier of the new technico-scientific communication of 
the project and taking initiatives, can engender posi­
tive or negative reactions from other social groups 
who may admire or envy its capacity and achieve­
ments.
Response to technical assistance is complex. The time 
taken for the emotional and motivational forces of a 
technical assistance project to take effect, results in a 
gap which impedes its success. It may be possible to 
learn to tolerate what technical assistance brings, but 
not necessarily to internalize it. The message of the 
project may be accepted as authoritative, but it may 
be blocked out as irrelevant by refusing to adapt to it 
beliefs or behavior of daily life; fcr tie ways of doing
1. For example, Buchanan and Ellis, in discussing the agri­
cultural revolution in England in the early 19th century, point 
out that the improved methods and techniques of cultivation 
which had been developed spread rather slowly «because people 
learn slowly even when they have for a example the evident suc­
cess of their fellows. Even with the benefit of demonstrations, 
lectures, and reading matter, the improved agricultural tech­
niques only gradually became general practice over the decades. 
It took longer still for them to spread over Europe from Eng­
land. The hard economic realities of cost, income and profit, or 
the necessity of getting a living probably had as much to do with 
converting the average landlord, squire, worker or peasant to 
new practices as friendly exhortations or the gracious patron­
age of royalty». N.S. Buchanan and H.S. Ellis, Approaches lo 
Economic Development (New York: Twentieth Century 
Fund, 1955), p. 131.
41
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are not always identical with the ways of knowing. 
Though considerable effort may be made to introduce 
a certain new method, a vague resentment may exist 
at the same time, a secret hope that it will not work in 
«our milieu». Such feelings may lead to an ambivalent 
attitude which may bring the unconsciously desired 
results. When the cure seems no cure, a subtle appre­
hension about the consequences of accepting techni­
cal assistance can disturb even those most favorably 
inclined to it. They may be torn by conflicting emo­
tions aroused by their awareness that they ought to 
adopt it but cannot in their situation; it may be con­
trary to the values and beliefs of the community.
Regarding functionality. This fourth view is of a 
different sort. In the conduct of technical assistance, 
the UN and its Specialized Agencies assume the re­
sponsibility to bring upon the developing country the 
knowledge, experience and insights of a leading ex­
pert or specialist, the technical assistance project of­
ficer. This view argues that whatever dedication and 
formal obeisance this officer makes to tradition, his 
ultimate aim is to induce change though, in practice, 
matters which entail policy preferences are usually 
beyond his control.
As change is often insensitive to the efforts of the 
technical assistance project officer, most of what was 
said previously about the processes of communica­
ting technico-scientific information or skills, might be 
cast now in terms of his limited ability to bring 
influence to bear, though one should not deny the 
relevance and potential usefulness of his persuasive 
efforts. The receptiveness of his communication 
involves several elements of ambiguity variously 
reflecting on the degree of its comprehensibility, 
acceptability and reproducibility.
The first set of considerations stems from the pro­
fessional and rational ideas that form part of the fra­
me of reference of the project officer. His perspectives 
reduce his ability to adapt to the predispositions of 
his hosts. His attempts to apply criteria of his profes­
sional assumptions cannot be pursued beyond a certain 
point without confronting his hosts’ values and behav­
ior patterns. How does he know that his own «reali­
ty world» is any more realistic than that of his hosts? 
Each may see his own traditions as normative, and 
may see no possibility for entertaining any other point 
of view.1
A project officer’s communication may run counter 
to social reality and to an abundant evidence from
1. Hoselitz referring to some recommendations made by UN 
experts to promote economic development commented that, 
«These men envisage that economic development is only pos­
sible if the social relations of underdeveloped countries are re­
formed so as to resemble those of Western capitalist countries». 
He then continued to quote from Kindleberger who —►
everyday experience that may leave no ground for 
even legitimate differences of opinion. There are not 
captive audiences that are even momentarily isolated 
from other forms of communication and experience. 
The dilemma is very real though it has bizarre mo­
ments. Active defenses will be called into play. His 
hosts may avoid advice which is not in accord with 
their pre-existing beliefs. The excessive enthusiasm 
with which a project officer is often greeted on arrival 
in his host country, is part of this ambivalent pattern. 
To the extent that the host country constitutes an «in­
group», the project officer belongs to an «out-group». 
The problem in this relationship is that it is possible 
to acknowledge «some» validity in the project officer’s 
viewpoint without really challenging the fundamentals 
of one’s own group’s thoughts.
There is not set of rules which a project officer 
could precisely follow in his work. To anticipate what 
steps or means would be most successful is hazardous. 
In his more statesmanlike role, which is usually im­
plicit rather than explicit, often unrealized even by the 
actors, the principal impact of his communication is 
often not direct,but mediated by face-to-face influence, 
even on a non-verbal basis. In the morass of conflict­
ing unconscious biases, the only hope for diminishing 
his own perpetual distortions lies in a combination of 
factors: a better knowledge and appreciaton of the 
sources of change, a persistent search for values, a 
sincere effort to assure continuing re-examination 
and re-interpretation of supposedly firm project ob­
jectives, and an ability to maintain an understanding 
and sympathetic attitude while preserving that critical 
attitude necessary in his work.
Regarding evaluation. How can we make an inven­
tory of change brought about by a given project? 
When we do not have quantifiable objectives, can we 
say that results are amenable to measurement? This 
fifth view holds that neither the determining of change 
nor the determining of social cost-benefit relation­
ships for a given project submit easily to quantifica­
tion. The number of variables are never exactly known; 
a desirable change may take place without knowing
—»commented in a similar vein on the reports of the World Bank: 
«Essentially, however, these are essays in comparative statics. 
The missions bring to the underdeveloped country a notion of 
what a developed country is like. They observe the underdevelop­
ed country. They subtract the later from the former. The differ­
ence is a program. Most of the missions come from developed 
countries with highly articulated institutions for achieving so­
cial, economic and political ends. Ethnocentricity leads inevit­
ably to the conclusion that the way to achieve the comparable 
levels of capital formation, productivity, and consumption is 
to duplicate these institutions». B.F. Hoselitz, «Sociological Ap­
proach to Economic Development», International Congress of 
Studies on the Problems of Underdeveloped Areas, Milan; 
Museo della Scienza e della Tecnica, 1954, pp. 19-42.
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why. Vast amounts of correlations may not lead to the 
qualitative insight of the change that technical assist­
ance brings.
The problem of evaluation is an offshoot of the prob­
lem of project objectives. Here there is a need to dis­
tinguish between lesser and larger objectives. When 
the lesser objectives of the project take precedence 
over its larger objectives and are viewed as ends in 
themselves aiming at the provision of short-range an­
swers, the search for quantitative targets and criteria is 
not always far from the realm of feasibility. However, 
when the lesser project objectives are viewed not as 
ends in themselves but as means or as limited indica­
tions of the degree to which its larger objectives are 
pursued within the processes of development, such a 
search acquires a new significance. There is little which 
is easily accessible. There is no objective criterion for 
measurement of failure or success. There is no clear- 
cut set of stipulations which permit and invite compar­
isons as to the best methods for determining the re­
sults of a technical assistance project or, for that mat­
ter, for indicating and judging orders of their magni­
tude. Furthermore, measuring the rate of change due 
to the technical assistance project relative to the rate 
of other non-technical assistance change is exceed­
ingly difficult. Technical assistance is not the only 
means whereby the processes of change are facilitated 
or modified.1
The crucial assumption which strikes at the very 
root of technical assistance is that results are born of 
actions. As men are involved in their everyday prob­
lem-solving, in terms of the communication that the 
project brings, results consist essentially of carrying 
out operations, integrating and coordinating them 
among themselves by joining in a chain of decisions 
which encourage and facilitate change, understanding 
the process of modification and transformation of the 
communication, and, as a consequence, understanding 
with a greater degree of realism the way the subject of 
the project itself is constructed. Such actions and in­
teractions are the essence of a technical assistance 
project, though, it must be recognized, they cannot 
bring results quickly. The knowingwhich technical as­
sistance brings may remain functionally unrelated to 
doing for a considerable period of time. This mode of 
thinking points out that results are obtained only 
through practice, study, personal interaction, and
1. In our search for some demanding criteria to judge the 
development merit of a given technical assistance project, the 
comments of the Executive Chairman of TAB provice us with 
a clue: «We must ensure», he writes, «that they (projects) are at 
or near the core and not on the periphery, of national develop- 
timent efforts; that they are directed towards development ac­
tivities which can attract public and private support, both moral 
and material; and that they are fully co-ordinated with other 
related programmes.» UN Doc. E/TAC/L352, 15 June 1965, p. 
16.
emotional adaptability, processes requiring time.
Once the process of development has begun, it does 
not usually move in a straight line at an even pace ac­
cording to a plan, but it takes many unexpected twists 
and turns. It cannot be ascertained that change is ex­
clusively due to technical assistance. It is often influ­
enced by considerations and actions of other agents 
of change. Desirable results may manifest themselves 
as a non-planned effect, external to the project, builds 
ing on unexpected new tendencies and influences. If 
we are to avoid the fallacy of irrelevant objectivity, 
such an unpredictable change or side effects, because 
they fall outside the influence of the project, carni oj 
be taken into account in measuring its results. By im­
plication, the temptation to make judgements regard­
ing the change that technical assistance brings, with­
out first making such discreet dictinctions, serves 
only a heuristic function which may lead to preten­
sions. The important point is that a project’s strength 
may not necessarily lie in the production of a desir­
able effect. It may grow instead out of something more 
subtle, as out of the exertion and struggle and even 
pains for that outcome, in themselves «unmeasured» 
benefits, or out of the induction of the growth of an 
unforeseen, but desirable, outcome which goes beyond 
the narrow framework of the project itself and which 
may turn out to be more significant than its original 
fragmentary, cut-and-dried objectives. Since the qual­
itative nature of such changes cannot be predicted or 
reflected in quantitative terms, the achievements of 
technical assistance are likely to be rather under­
stated.
The process of development is not merely goal- 
oriented. As it prepares people for new roles, new re­
sponsibilities and new problems, it implies a growth 
toward a differentiated society. And in it, the new 
functions and new institutions, and the new jobs that 
have to be filled, are all associated with a continuous­
ly evolving social organization and role structure. The 
implication is that evaluating judgements regarding 
the results of technical assistance must be based on a 
thorough knowledge of the country as an entity—its 
structure, functions, culture, emotional adaptability. 
In this context, only with adequate explanation can 
one understand the results of technical assistance and 
consequently can seek to evaluate them. Without this 
explanation, evaluation becomes a matter of insight 
or, maybe, of luck.
beyond conventional analysis
Our concern to approximate development efforts 
and technical assistance more closely reflects a m; jor 
problem which requires persistent efforts at several 
levels. We still do not know much about technical as­
sistance; we have not yet come to grips with the prac­
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tical problems generated from development expecta­
tions. Little study has been directed to elucidating in 
detail what really happens. We are becoming increas­
ingly aware that the time has arrived for a reorienta­
tion of technical assistance, which has yet to be suf­
ficiently articulated, that will permit us to maintain 
the pluralism, integrity and enduring quality of Uni­
ted Nations efforts and to continue the search for new 
evidence relevant to the points at issue. It is hoped 
that such freshness of attitude will enable us to avoid 
the donor/recipient dichotomy and develop at a high­
er level of relevance and sophistication a new, more 
imaginative approach to the administration of tech­
nical assistance.
The significant thing here is that whether such a 
microanalytic approach to technical assistance is 
right or wrong, methodologically it does sensitize us 
to look for the sources of change coming from the ag­
gregate and individual decisions, the influence of cus­
tom in the adaptation of standards of living, the role 
of emotional adaptability to change, the inevitability 
of technico-scientific growth, the appearance of new 
class styles and their relationship to the country’s po­
litical maturity, and the sense of community between 
technical assistance project officer and his hosts. This 
kind of sensitivity probably conflictswith an unavoid­
able flavor of condescension. Each of the above views 
implies that there is no possibility of asserting suc­
cess of technical assistance in absolute terms. The dif­
ficulty probably lies (a) partly in the lack of a common 
denominator and in our inability to make sweeping 
interpretations and clearly discern the effects of tech­
nical assistance which are likely to be different for dif­
ferent projects; (b) partly in the fact that technical as­
sistance as a live and dynamic process is open, 
through self-adjustment,to fluctuations which, in turn, 
spring from the dynamism of the processes of devel­
opment; (c) partly in the propensity of technical as­
sistance to be manageable only to the degree that the 
exercise of orderly human intelligence can be brought 
to bear, to the speed of emotional adaptability to 
change and to the ways the present, past and future 
are perceived; and (d) partly in our emphasis not on 
achievement but on achieving, not on attainment but 
on attaining, not on perfection but on perfecting. With 
these qualifications in mind, it is doubtful whether 
technical assistance can easily replace, in the short- 
run at least, old with new certitudes. Instead, being the 
subject of inherent instability, considerations regard­
ing the effects of technical assistance and assessment 
of its potentialities are likely to be vague and few, 
yield1 ng increasignly tentative statements of probabil­
ity.
In other words, technical assistance does not pos­
sess any miracle properties. It will continue to be con­
fronted by the myopic limitations of the human mind
to grasp its multidimensional character and the un­
certainties reflecting the limited capacity of human ef­
fort to quickly translate hopes into achievements. The 
inner changes and the new ways that technical assist­
ance brings into being, despite the magnitude of the 
achievements to which they are likely to contribute, 
in many respects are echoed in the profound and dis­
ruptive effects which they bring on the prevailing cul­
ture. To overlook some of the factors that affect the 
internalization of technical assistance may lead to a 
failure to grasp its essence and appreciate the signifi­
cance of attitude changes and its consequences. Fur­
thermore, acceleration and expectation of quick re­
sults may lead to a failure to understand why a partic­
ular country may not respond to technical assistance 
so manifestly for its own benefit. It may not assist one 
who is looking for immediate and visible results to 
understand why familiar beliefs and practices continue 
to exist or why components that were largely self-cen­
tered become interrelated now, or even why change 
may not be considered desirable or helpful.
ANNEX I
Findings of the International Survey of Expert 
Advice conducted by the UN Research Institute 
for Social Development
This study (designed by Professor Herbert H. Hy­
man) was based on the opinions, beliefs, and experi­
ences of 445 national and foreign experts who have 
worked under international or bilateral auspices on 
development projects in specific fields: agriculture, 
health, nutrition, adult education, home economics, 
and community development. It was carried out in 
close cooperation with the Bureau of Social Affairs 
of the UN in view of the preparation of the 1965 Re­
port on the World Social Situation. The study was 
conducted in two stages. The first, 1964-1965, includ­
ed persons who had worked in one or more of ten 
specified countries in three general regions of the 
world. The second stage, 1965-1966, was extended to 
include experts who had worked in Cambodia, Iran or 
Pakistan.
In the words of the report, this study was intended 
to be of «benefit to many governmental and non-gov­
ernmental agencies and to individual workers inter­
ested in methods to be used in developmental activi­
ties in developing countries». Its purpose was not to 
establish guidelines to development policies or give 
definitive answers to questions of social change. In­
stead, its usefulness was stated as aiming to «increase 
the awareness of many factors which influence the out­
come of development projects, of various aspects con­
nected with success or failure of specific methods». 
This study «should therefore function as a kind of
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'sensitivity training’ for all those who have to design 
or implement development projects».
The principal findings have been stated as follows:
1. The method and approach used in approaching lo­
cal populations is an important factor making for the 
success of development projects. Traditional prac­
tices and the low level of general education have been 
most frequently mentioned as the greatest hind­
rances to the success of development projects. The 
older (especially old men) are the typical local antag­
onists to development projects.
2. Regarding strategies for introducing social change, 
the experts largely agree that it is necessary to change 
the method and approach to suit special local condi­
tions. And the largest proportion of them recommend 
that the approach be selective and slow. They largely 
agree that it is a safe strategy to use school teachers’ 
as intermediaries in approaching the local population 
—but there is less agreement about the utilization of 
other types of intermediaries.
3. On the question of the tactics to be used in intro­
ducing social change, there are strong recommenda­
tions that persuation and interpersonal influence are 
the most effective devices. And many tend to advice
the introduction of techniques that will evolve the lo­
cal people actively in the work in progress.
4. Regarding staff qualities, the largest proportion 
say that the most serious deficiency in a staff member 
is inappropriate attitudes toward local population. 
The experts tend to favour the professional with many 
skills or even the person without any special training 
(but with common sense) over the specialized expert 
both in the early and in the later stages of project 
work.
5. A variety of techniques was used on the latest proj­
ects to achieve their goals. But far and away the most 
effective technique in the opinion of the experts is the 
demonstration, and the least effective the lecture.
6. Regarding project evaluation, nearly all the ex­
perts questioned make mention of major mistakes 
that were made on their latest projects. And the majo­
rity believe that such errors are avoidable. Even so, 
to a remarkable degree the experts rate their latest 
projects as successes. A thorough analysis of data has 
revealed that the degree of severity of local conditions 
had made remarkably little difference in the extent to 
which the informant’s latest projects have been able 
to achieve their goals.
But, even more important, the outstanding characteristic of a well trained scientist 
is his ability to distinguish «significant» from «insignificant» problems and data. Good 
scientific training sensitizes one to important problems;... it gives the scientist a selec­
tive point of view. Research without an actively selective point of view becomes the dit­
ty bag of an idiot, filled with bits of pebbles, straws, feathers, and other random hoar­
dings. If nobody goes about endlessly counting throughout a lifetime the number of 
particles of sand along infinite miles of seashore over all the coasts of the world, why 
is this? Because there is no point to it, no need to complete this particular aspect of the 
jigsaw puzzle of the unknown.
Robert S. Lynd, «Knowledge for What?». Princeton University Press, 1939.
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